We study an equilibrium model for the pricing of a defaultable zero coupon bond issued by a firm in the framework of Back [2] . The market consists of a risk-neutral informed agent, noise traders and a market maker who sets the price using the total order. When the insider does not trade, the default time possesses a default intensity in market's view as in reduced-form credit risk models. However, we show that, in the equilibrium, the modelling becomes structural in the sense that the default time becomes the first time that some continuous observation process falls below a certain barrier. Interestingly, the firm value is still not observable. We also establish the no expected trade theorem that the insider's trades are inconspicuous.
Introduction
In the valuation of credit derivatives the key issue is the calculation of the probabilities associated to the default event for which the product is written. There are essentially two approaches in the literature to model the default probabilities: structural approach and reduced-form approach. The structural approach dates back to Black and Scholes [4] and Merton [20] while the reduced-form models originated with Jarrow and Turnbull [13] . As argued by Jarrow and Protter [12] the difference between these two approaches lies on the amount of information available to the modeler. Structural models assume the modeler has the same information as the manager of the firm and, thus, has the continuous knowledge of the firm's assets and liabilities. In these models the default time is modelled to be the first time that the firm's value falls below a certain barrier. Consequently, this approach might come up with a model, e.g. if the firm value is assumed to be continuous, where the default time is predictable to the modeler. This feature of the model makes the yield spreads on the defaultable bonds approach to zero very quickly as one gets close to maturity. However, such behavior in the yield spreads is not common in practice (see, e.g. [11] ).
In contrast the reduced-form models in general take the default time as exogenous and model the information available to the modeler. The modeler does not have the full information that the manager of the firm possesses but only a subset generated by the default process and several other related state variables. This approach was originated by Jarrow and Turnbull [13] and there has been a considerable literature on these models since then. In this respect one can mention the works of Jarrow and Turnbull [14] , Artzner and Delbaen [1] , Duffie, Schroder and Skiadas [10] , Lando ([18] , [19] ) and Duffie and Singleton [9] to name a few. The common characteristic of these models is that there exists a default arrival intensity as a function of state variables and the default process. This aspect of reduced form modelling excludes such abnormal behavior of yield spreads as observed in the structural models. The existence of the default intensity implies that, in mathematical terms, the default time is a totally inaccessible stopping time. Therefore, the default time cannot be anticipated by the market and comes as a total surprise.
Although they seem conceptually different, one may pass from a structural model to a reduced form model. One can do this by assuming that the market's information set is that of the manager plus some noise as in Duffie and Lando [7] , or restricting the information set of the market by assuming that the market only knows whether the firm is in financial distress or not as in Ç etin, et al. [5] . The common feature of the both models is that they start with a structural model to define the default time, however, they are still able to come up with default intensities although the firm value is assumed to be continuous. We will not elaborate further on the differences of these two model but refer the reader to the recent works by Bielecki and Rutkowski [3] , Duffie and Singleton [8] and Jarrow and Protter [12] .
In this paper we present a market model for defaultable bonds that contains both of these models. The default time is exogenously given to the market for a defaultable bond. However, there is one trader, that we call insider, who has an extra information about the default time τ compared to the other traders, that we call noise traders, in the market who trade for liquidity reasons. There is also a market maker who clears the market given the total demand. The insider is assumed to know the default time. The default event is obviously predictable to the insider as the case in the structural models but it is totally inaccessible to the market maker if the insider doesn't trade and it has a density, as in reduced form credit risk models. The market maker chooses a pricing rule and the insider chooses a trading strategy where the cumulative demand of the noise traders is modelled by a Brownian motion. The equilibrium is defined similar to that in Back [2] . We show that in the equilibrium the insider's trades cannot be seen in the market and the default time becomes the first time that the continuous total order process falls below a certain barrier. Consequently, the model becomes structural although the firm value is still not observable. We also show that the equilibrium total order process is a Brownian motion in its own filtration, hence the insider's trades are inconspicuous, but a 3-dimensional Bessel bridge of length τ in the insider's view, where τ is the default time (see Theorem 3.1 for the precise statement). The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduced the model. Section 3 solves the equilibrium pricing rule and the demand for the defaultable bond. Section 4 concludes.
The model
A company issues a bond that pays 1 unit of a currency at time 1 unless it defaults before that time. We suppose that the defaultable bond's recovery rate is 0 for simplicity. The company's default time is modelled by a random time τ defined on a probability space (Ω, F, P). The equilibrium framework of our model follows closely that of Back [2] . We refer the reader to Back [2] for motivation and details that are not explained in what follows. We suppose the default time is given by
where Z is a standard Brownian motion that will be assumed independent of the Brownian motion modelling the noise traders demand (see below). It is well-known that
where
We may view Z as the value of the firm under a risk-neutral measure and −1 can be considered as default barrier. More general forms for the firm's value process can be chosen. However, we retain this Brownian assumption for the firm's value process for transparency of our results. Three types of agents act in this market:
1. The noise traders: as in Back's model [2] , they can only observe their own cumulative demands and whether the default has happened or not. Their cumulative demand is modelled by a standard Brownian motion B, whose completed natural filtration is denoted by F B = (F B t ) t≥0 and independent of Z. 2. The informed trader: apart from observing continuously in time the defaultable bond prices, the insider knows the default time, τ . We denote F I her filtration and assume that she is risk-neutral, so that her objective is to maximize her expected profit.
3. The market maker: the market maker observes the total order of the noise traders and the insider, sets the price of the risky asset and buy or sell for his on account to clear the market.
Insider's objective. As in Back's model [2] , insider's trading strategies θ will be assumed to be absolutely continuous for optimality reasons so that dθ t = α t dt, where α is an F
I
-adapted process such that
Being risk-neutral, the insider has the objective to maximize her expected wealth at time 1. Note that the value of the zero-coupon bond to the insider equals 1 [τ >1] all the time. Using this insight and following the arguments leading to the wealth process of the insider in Back [2] , we find that
where S t denotes the market price of the defaultable bond at time t, which is assigned by the market-maker. We will give the precise definition of admissible strategies for the insider after explaining what a pricing rule is in this framework.
Market maker's objective.
The market maker sets the price of the defaultable bond using his information set, which consists of two parts. The first component is the total order of the noise traders and the insider, which is denoted with Y and has the decomposition
where the constant Y 0 is the demand for the defaultable bond just before the insider starts to trade and θ is the position of the insider in the defaultable bond. Note that we stop the market at time τ so that there is no trading in the defaultable bond once the default has occurred. We denote the minimal right continuous and complete filtration generated by Y θ with F Y , where we suppress the dependency on θ in the notation. The second part of the market maker's information comes from the observation of the default event, i.e. the market maker also observes whether the default has happened or not. In mathematical terminology, this makes τ a stopping time in his filtration. Therefore, the market maker's information is modelled by the filtration
denote the indicator function of no-default by time t. The modelling idea, as borrowed from Back [2] , is that the market maker assigns the price looking at the current total order and whether the default has happened. Thus, S t denoting the market price of the bond at time t, we expect
where H : [0, 1] × R → R is the pricing rule of the market maker. This justifies the following definition:
y → H(t, y) is strictly increasing for every
Moreover, let θ be a trading strategy of the insider. Given θ, a pricing rule H is said to be rational if it satisfies
Remark 1 Since the insider observes the price and the pricing rule is monotone, the insider's filtration, F I is generated by B and τ . Since B and τ are independent, B is also an We are now able to give the definitions of admissible trading strategies for the insider, and equilibrium in this setting: 
The set of all admissible strategies is denoted with A.
The condition 3 above is set to rule out doubling strategies. For a more detailed discussion of this condition, we refer the reader to Back [2] . 
Equilibrium
In this section, we will look for the existence of an equilibrium as defined in Definition 2.3. We'll first address the optimality condition for the insider.
Optimality conditions for the insider's problem
Let us fix a pricing rule H. Then the insider's problem becomes
For a given strategy α, let us write
Note that we are in a similar situation as in Back [2] (see also Cho [6] ). Using the arguments therein, the solution to (3.4) exists if the following system has a solution:
This implies that for any total order process Y , associated to an admissible strategy of the insider, H satisfies
Although the dependency of J on 1 [τ >1] is obvious, we'll suppress it in the notation as long as no confusion arises. Proof. Keeping in mind that τ ∧ 1 ∈ F I 0 , we refer to Back [2] (Theorem 2, p. 396) or Cho [6] (Lemmas 4 and 5, p. 56).
Lemma 3.1 (Theorem 2, Back [2]) If a pricing rule H verifies equation (3.7), then there exist a function J satisfying the system given by (3.5) and (3.6). Moreover, one has
In the sequel, a rational pricing rule H will be given. We will investigate what properties an admissible insider strategy should satisfy in order to be optimal. We will denote with H −1 (τ ∧ 1, ·) the inverse of H(τ ∧ 1, ·) with respect to the second variable. 
(3.9) By standard filtering arguments it is not difficult to see that
. To see this, consider the process
N is clearly an F M -martingale. As a consequence, we have that 
This proves that 1 and 2 are equivalent since H is strictly increasing in the second variable. It remains to show that 2 and 3 are equivalent. For this, it suffices to observe that, in view of (3.10),
The next lemma gives a necessary and sufficient condition for an admissible strategy to be optimal given a rational pricing rule H.
Lemma 3.2 Given a rational pricing rule H, θ *
∈ A is an optimal insider strategy if and only if it satisfies the following two properties:
the corresponding optimal total order
Y * satisfies Y * τ ∧1 = H −1 (τ ∧ 1, 1 [τ >1] ).
Proof.
Let H be a rational pricing rule. Suppose θ * is a corresponding optimal strategy of the insider. HJB equations ((3.5) and (3.6)) require that H satisfies equation (3.7), and by Lemma 3.1 there exists a function J satisfying the system given by (3.5), (3.6) and the boundary condition
An application of Itô's formula gives, on the event
Now, condition 3 of Definition 2.2 implies
The expected future wealth reaches its maximum when . This equality is satisfied thanks to property 2.
The equilibrium and its interpretation
The following lemma is essential in the characterization of the equilibrium. 
12)
Next define a globally Lipschitz a n such that a n agrees with a on {(t, x) : 
. This, together with the estimate in (3.13), implies The following theorem is the main result of our paper. It gives the existence and a characterization of the equilibrium. Moreover, it shows that in the equilibrium the default time τ is an hitting time of the equilibrium total order process Y * , which is shown to have continuous paths, so giving a default time predictable in market maker's view as is the case in structural credit risk modelling. 
Conclusions
We have analyzed the effects of asymmetric information in defaultable bond pricing. In an equilibrium settingà la Back [2] we have shown that the information asymmetries can change the nature of the modelling completely. We solved for the equilibrium pricing rule for the market maker, optimal strategy for the insider and equilibrium demand for the defaultable bond. It is shown that it is optimal for the insider to trade without being seen while driving the total demand to hit a certain level at the default time. The presence of a rational insider turns the modelling into structural while the model is reduced-form in the absence of the insider.
